A. In any proceeding for the dissolution of marriage, division of property, disposition of children or spousal support, the court may make and enforce by attachment or otherwise an order to restrain the use or disposition of the property of either party or for the control of the children or to provide for the support of either party during the pendency of the proceeding, as in its discretion may seem just and proper. The court may make an order, relative to the expenses of the proceeding, as will ensure either party an efficient preparation and presentation of his case. B. On final hearing, the court: (1) may allow either party such a reasonable portion of the spouse's property or such a reasonable sum of money to be paid by either spouse either in a single sum or in installments, as spousal support as under the circumstances of the case may seem just and proper, including a court award of: (a) rehabilitative spousal support that provides the receiving spouse with education, training, work experience or other forms of rehabilitation that increases the receiving spouse's ability to earn income and become self-supporting. The court may include a specific rehabilitation plan with its award of rehabilitative spousal support and may condition continuation of the support upon compliance with that plan; (b) transitional spousal support to supplement the income of the receiving spouse for a limited period of time; provided that the period shall be clearly stated in the court's final order; (c) spousal support for an indefinite duration; (d) a single sum to be paid in one or more installments that specifies definite amounts, subject only to the death of the receiving spouse; or (e) a single sum to be paid in one or more installments that specifies definite amounts, not subject to any contingencies, including the death of the receiving spouse; (2) may: (a) modify and change any order in respect to spousal support awarded pursuant to the provisions of Subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of Paragraph (1) of this subsection whenever the circumstances render such change proper; or (b) designate spousal support awarded pursuant to the provisions of Subparagraph (a) or (b) of Paragraph (1) of this subsection as nonmodifiable with respect to the amount or duration of the support payments; (3) may set apart out of the property or income of the respective parties such portion for the maintenance and education of: (a) their unemancipated minor children as may seem just and proper; or (b) their children until the children's graduation from high school if the children are emancipated only by age, are under nineteen and are attending high school; and (4) may make such an order for the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance and education of the minor children, or with reference to the control of the property of the respective parties to the proceeding, or with reference to the control of the property decreed or fund created by the court for the maintenance and education of the minor children, as may seem just and proper. C. The court may order and enforce the payment of support for the maintenance and education after high school of emancipated children of the marriage pursuant to a written agreement between the parties. D. An award of spousal support made pursuant to the provisions of Subparagraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Paragraph (1) of Subsection B of this section shall terminate upon the death of the receiving spouse, unless the court order of spousal support provides otherwise. E. When making determinations concerning spousal support to be awarded pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph (1) or (2) of Subsection B of this section, the court shall consider: (1) the age and health of and the means of support for the respective spouses; (2) the current and future earnings and the earning capacity of the respective spouses; (3) the good-faith efforts of the respective spouses to maintain employment or to become self-supporting; (4) the reasonable needs of the respective spouses, including: (a) the standard of living of the respective spouses during the term of the marriage; (b) the maintenance of medical insurance for the respective spouses; and (c) the appropriateness of life insurance, including its availability and cost, insuring the life of the person who is to pay support to secure the payments, with any life insurance proceeds paid on the death of the paying spouse to be in lieu of further support; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the amount of the property awarded or confirmed to the respective spouses; (7) the type and nature of the respective spouses' assets; provided that potential proceeds from the sale of property by either spouse shall not be considered by the court, unless required by exceptional circumstances and the need to be fair to the parties; (8) the type and nature of the respective spouses' liabilities; (9) income produced by property owned by the respective spouses; and (10) agreements entered into by the spouses in contemplation of the dissolution of marriage or legal separation. F. The court shall retain jurisdiction over proceedings involving periodic spousal support payments when the parties have been married for twenty years or more prior to the dissolution of the marriage, unless the court order or decree specifically provides that no spousal support shall be awarded. G. The court may modify and change any order or agreement merged into an order in respect to the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance or education of the children whenever circumstances render such change proper. The district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance and education of the children until the parents' obligation of support for their children terminates. The district court shall also have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction with reference to the property decreed or funds created for the children's maintenance and education. History: Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 27; Code 1915, § 2778; C.S. 1929, § 68-506; 1941 Comp., § 25-706; Laws 1943, ch. 46, § 1; 1953 Comp., § 22-7-6; Laws 1973, ch. 319, § 7; 1993, ch. 144, § 1; 1997, ch. 56, § 1. Cross references. — For provisions pertaining to a supervised visitation program, see 40-12-5.1 NMSA 1978. For determination of award of child support, see 40-4-11 NMSA 1978. For mandatory Medical Support Act, see 40-4C-1 to 40-4C-14 NMSA 1978. The 1997 amendment, effective June 20, 1997, added Subparagraphs B(3)(a) and B(3)(b) and made related stylistic changes; added Subsection C and redesignated former Subsections C through F as D through G; and in Subsection G, substituted "until the parents' obligation of support for their children terminates" for "so long as the children remain minors". The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, in Subsection A, substituted "spousal support" for "alimony" in the first sentence; in Subsection B, rewrote Paragraphs (1) and (2); added present Subsections C through E, redesignating former Subsection C as Subsection F; in Subsection F, rewrote the second sentence as the present third and fourth sentences and deleted the former third sentence, which concerned the disposition of funds remaining when the children reach the age of majority; and made stylistic changes in the second sentence of subsection A and in Paragraph (3) of Subsection B. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Inherent powers of court. — A New Mexico district court has the power to sanction a parent for misconduct that occurred before a South Dakota court where the parent pursued an action in the South Dakota court in an attempt to improperly gain custody of a child, while concealing the New Mexico proceedings from the South Dakota court and for wilful disobedience of a court order for failing to return the child after the South Dakota visitation, as mediated by the parties under an order of the New Mexico district court. Seipert v. Johnson , 2003-NMCA-119, 134 N.M. 394, 77 P.3d 298, cert. denied, 2003-NMCERT-009, 134 N.M. 374, 77 P.3d 278. Construing divorce decrees. — Divorce decrees are to be construed as other written instruments. A district court determination that a written instrument is unambiguous as a matter of law is therefore not binding on the appellate court which may consider the legal effect of the document itself. Schueller v. Schueller , 1994-NMCA-014, 117 N.M. 197, 870 P.2d 159. This section does not apply to annulment actions. Panzer v. Panzer , 1974-NMSC-092, 87 N.M. 29, 528 P.2d 888. This section has no reference to actions to annul an invalid marriage. Prince v. Freeman , 1941-NMSC-006, 45 N.M. 143, 112 P.2d 821. This section does not apply to a nonmodifiable lump sum alimony agreement. Edens v. Edens , 2005-NMCA-033, 137 N.M. 207, 109 P.3d 295, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-003, 137 N.M. 290, 110 P.3d 506. Conflict between decree and statute. — Where there is a conflict between provisions of the divorce decree and a statute of the state of New Mexico, the statute is controlling. Scanlon v. Scanlon , 1955-NMSC-035, 60 N.M. 43, 287 P.2d 238. "Either party" as used in Subsection A of this section can logically only refer to the parties to the underlying domestic relations proceeding, that is, husband and wife. Garcia v. Jeantette , 2004-NMCA-004, 134 N.M. 776, 82 P.3d 947. Exclusive jurisdiction not indefinite jurisdiction. — A court acquires exclusive jurisdiction over the property involved for purposes of a division of the property, or a modification of the decree as to payments for alimony, maintenance and education of the minor children, but this does not mean that such court may retain such jurisdiction indefinitely or that another court of concurrent jurisdiction may not acquire jurisdiction over the property at a time when the proceeding is apparently settled. Ortiz v. Gonzales , 1958-NMSC-109, 64 N.M. 445, 329 P.2d 1027. Finality of judgment not destroyed by reservation of continuing jurisdiction. — A reservation of continuing jurisdiction by the trial court in divorce proceedings does not destroy the finality of a final judgment, once the judgment is entered. Like any other final award or decision, they are subject to attack only upon a showing of relief provided for under Rules 59 and 60(b), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now 1-059 and 1-060 NMRA). Smith v. Smith , 1982-NMSC-088, 98 N.M. 468, 649 P.2d 1381. Doctrine of res judicata does not preclude decision from first court. — Where the New Mexico district court entered its final decree and custody award on April 10, more than a week before the Colorado district court entered its decision that the former court lacked jurisdiction, the New Mexico district court could not be precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from entering a decision in the matter. Worland v. Worland , 1976-NMSC-027, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d 981. Jurisdiction of federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings. — Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 greatly expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts, jurisdiction over such matters as marriage, divorce, child custody, alimony and child support, remains in state courts. Dirks v. Dirks , 15 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981). Despite the fact that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to determine domestic relations matters, congress did intend that the bankruptcy courts should be able to determine whether characterizations of alimony or support made by state courts meet the meaning of such terms as they arise in the bankruptcy context. Dirks v. Dirks , 15 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981). Alimony, child support and maintenance nondischargeable in bankruptcy. — Amounts due a former spouse of the debtor constituting alimony, child support or maintenance are nondischargeable debts so long as such sums are payable directly to the former spouse and actually represent alimony, child support or maintenance. Lekvold v. Henderson , 18 Bankr. 663 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982). If decree is clear and unambiguous, neither pleadings, findings nor matters dehors the record may be used to change its meaning or even to construe it. Chavez v. Chavez , 1971-NMSC-062, 82 N.M. 624, 485 P.2d 735. Modification of divorce decree is not required except upon a showing of material change of circumstances, but upon a showing of such change of circumstances or new facts it may be done. Tuttle v. Tuttle , 1959-NMSC-063, 66 N.M. 134, 343 P.2d 838. Attempt to convert divorce suit into action for debt unauthorized. — The attempt of an attorney to convert a divorce suit into an action by him against the wife for debt was wholly unauthorized, and the resulting judgment rendered against her is void. Lloyd v. Lloyd , 1956-NMSC-007, 60 N.M. 441, 292 P.2d 121. Trial court may order the husband in a divorce action to make a suitable allowance to the wife to the end her case may be adequately presented, but this does not give her attorney the right to recover a judgment against the husband in an independent action. Lloyd v. Lloyd , 1956-NMSC-007, 60 N.M. 441, 292 P.2d 121. Language of section became part of agreement and decree. — The language from this section as it existed at the time the separation agreement was made became a part of the agreement when it became a part of the decree of divorce, even though the parties may not have had knowledge of the existence of the statute. Scanlon v. Scanlon , 1955-NMSC-035, 60 N.M. 43, 287 P.2d 238. No presumption that separation agreements fraudulent. — While it is true that if a fiduciary relationship is shown and that as a result of confidence reposed by the one, dominion and influence resulting from such confidence can be exercised by the other, fraud and undue influence may be presumed to exist when an advantage is gained by the dominant party at the expense of the confiding party; nevertheless, the modern trend holds that when a husband and wife have separated or are about to separate and seek by agreement to settle their respective rights and obligations, they deal at arm's length. There is no presumption that separation agreements are fraudulent, and that one who asserts the invalidity of such agreement has the burden of proving that it is tainted by fraud, duress or overreaching. Unser v. Unser , 1974-NMSC-063, 86 N.M. 648, 526 P.2d 790. Separation agreement subject to change by court. — A separation agreement in New Mexico, though binding upon the parties during such time as they are separated as husband and wife, when submitted in a divorce case for consideration of the court, is subject to such action as the court in its discretion may take, and the court may disregard any previous agreement for support and make such award as in the discretion of the court may seem just and fair. Scanlon v. Scanlon , 1955-NMSC-035, 60 N.M. 43, 287 P.2d 238. Authority to modify child custody or support order. — Trial courts, in proceedings for dissolution of a marriage, have the power and authority to execute, modify or vacate any order involving the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance and education of minor children. Rhinehart v. Nowlin , 1990-NMCA-136, 111 N.M. 319, 805 P.2d 88. Court had discretion to fashion installment payment plan. — In a contempt counterclaim by the wife, the trial court had the discretion to fashion an installment payment plan of the husband's debt of child support and alimony arrearages. Corliss v. Corliss , 1976-NMSC-023, 89 N.M. 235, 549 P.2d 1070. Judgment final despite continuing jurisdiction of court. — The court's reservation of continuing jurisdiction over the parties to modify such matters as alimony, support or custody does not destroy the finality of a judgment. Thornton v. Gamble , 1984-NMCA-093, 101 N.M. 764, 688 P.2d 1268. Awarding of alimony or child support rests within sound discretion of court. Muckleroy v. Muckleroy , 1972-NMSC-051, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357; Hurley v. Hurley , 1980-NMSC-067, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256. The decision to grant or deny alimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will be altered only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Ellsworth v. Ellsworth , 1981-NMSC-132, 97 N.M. 133, 637 P.2d 564. Power to grant alimony and attorney fees. — District court has jurisdiction and power to grant the wife temporary allowance and solicitors' fees, and to enforce payment of them against the husband or his property in the absence of sufficient separate estate belonging to the wife, or to charge them against any common property belonging to both husband and wife, whether such property is in the control of the husband or wife; and where the wife has ample estate of her own she may charge it with necessary solicitors' fees to enable her to prosecute or defend a divorce action to which she is a party, which the court will allow when they are necessary and reasonable. Lamy v. Catron , 1890-NMSC-003, 5 N.M. 373, 23 P. 773 (decided under former law). Adjustment of property division on remand. — Where, although the wife requested alimony, the trial court found she had failed to show need, and that finding was not challenged on appeal, on remand, the court in its discretion was limited to reconsidering the fairness and equity of the balance of the property division, and making whatever adjustments were necessary to achieve a fair and equitable division and disposition of the parties' property and other interests. Bayer v. Bayer , 1990-NMCA-106, 110 N.M. 782, 800 P.2d 216. Supreme court has inherent power to make allowance of counsel's fees on appeal of $750 to wife, taxed as costs to defendant-husband, when on appeal the court finds an error in the judgment of the trial court in a suit brought by wife to divide property. Jones v. Jones , 1960-NMSC-106, 67 N.M. 415, 356 P.2d 231. An award of attorney's fees was appropriate. — Award of $2,500 in attorney fees to petitioner was warranted on appeal. Rhinehart v. Nowlin , 1990-NMCA-136, 111 N.M. 319, 805 P.2d 88. Evidence of economic disparity. — The evidence of economic disparity between husband and wife supported the trial court's award of $20,000 in attorney's fees to the wife. Monsanto v. Monsanto , 1995-NMCA-048, 119 N.M. 678, 894 P.2d 1034. An award of attorney's fees to the mother was appropriate since the trial court considered the economic disparity between the parties, and considered the father's financial circumstances in reaching its findings regarding his gross monthly income and in allowing him to make installment payments on the award. Alverson v. Harris , 1997-NMCA-024, 123 N.M. 153, 935 P.2d 1165. An award of attorneys' fees was inappropriate since the matter of attorneys' fees had been covered by the original decree, and the present effort to set aside that decree on ill-founded grounds had been unsuccessful. Unser v. Unser , 1974-NMSC-063, 86 N.M. 648, 526 P.2d 790. Judgment for attorney's fees, costs and travel expenses was a personal judgment against the husband, and in order to enter such a judgment the trial court must have had personal jurisdiction over the husband for that purpose. Since none of these items are included in the long-arm statute by virtue of which the court had jurisdiction over the nonresident husband to decree a divorce on the issue of custody jurisdiction, the judgment as to attorney's fees, costs and travel expenses was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and was null and void in that respect. Worland v. Worland , 1976-NMSC-027, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d 981. Excessive attorneys' fees. — In a contested divorce action in which more than one full day was spent in trying the case, which necessitated considerable preparation by appellee's counsel, the court does not feel that an award of $500 for attorneys' fees is so excessive as to require reversal as being an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Moore v. Moore , 1963-NMSC-047, 71 N.M. 495, 379 P.2d 784. A fee fixed by trial court is a finding not to be disturbed unless patently erroneous as reflecting an abuse of discretion; the reasons which would call for a disturbance of the amount so fixed by a trial court must be very persuasive since the trial court which fixes the fee supposedly has a superior knowledge of the actual services rendered and the charges usually prevailing in the particular locality for such services. Michelson v. Michelson , 1976-NMSC-026, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638. Since fees may be allowed by court husband not liable in independent suit. — Where counsel and suit fees may be allowed by court, the husband is not liable in an independent suit by the wife's attorney for necessary disbursements in the case. LaFollette v. Romero , 1931-NMSC-037, 35 N.M. 509, 2 P.2d 310. Section broad enough to authorize order to pay appeal costs. — Where decree of divorce has been granted a husband, and the wife appeals, the husband's appeal from an order requiring him to pay the costs of her appeal will be denied, this section being sufficiently broad to authorize such order. Oldham v. Oldham , 1922-NMSC-050, 28 N.M. 163, 208 P. 886, aff'd , 1923-NMSC-064, 28 N.M. 619, 216 P. 497. Attorney fees at appellate level. — Where husband appeals from a judgment concerning alimony award and where court finds a need for the wife to receive assistance with her lawyer's fees at the appellate level, this section is applicable to provide for an award for attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Miller v. Miller , 1981-NMSC-078, 96 N.M. 497, 632 P.2d 732. Award reversed absent findings to support it. — Award of costs to father in the amount of $3,000 was reversed, where there were no findings on the factors necessary to support the award. Newhouse v. Chavez , 1988-NMCA-110, 108 N.M. 319, 772 P.2d 353, cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197, 769 P.2d 731 (1989). Considerations in awarding attorney fees. — While the award of attorney fees to one spouse is discretionary, the trial court should consider the relative financial status of the parties and the ability of the parties to employ and pay counsel. Foutz v. Foutz , 1990-NMCA-093, 110 N.M. 642, 798 P.2d 592. When denying award is error. — Where a party lacks sufficient funds to pay attorney fees for representation incident to dissolution of marriage or rights incident thereto, and the financial situation of the parties is disparate, it is error to deny an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Sheets v. Sheets , 1987-NMCA-128, 106 N.M. 451, 744 P.2d 924. II. DIVISION OF PROPERTY. A. IN GENERAL. Stock options. — Unvested stock options that provided a spouse with a valuable right in a contingent benefit were community property. Garcia v. Mayer , 1996-NMCA-61, 122 N.M. 57, 920 P.2d 522. Irrevocable trust. — When an irrevocable trust is set up for the benefit of third parties and neither spouse is a trustee or has a beneficial interest, a trial court may not dispose of it, even if one or both of the spouses created or funded the trust. Vanderlugt v. Vanderlugt , 2018-NMCA-073. Where husband, prior to his marriage to wife, created an irrevocable life insurance trust for the benefit of his children, and where neither spouse was a trustee or had a beneficial interest in the trust, the district court erred in determining that there was a community lien interest in the corpus of the irrevocable trust, because the trust was not owned or controlled by either spouse, husband was not able to access the assets of the trust, was not a beneficiary or a trustee and did not have a property interest in the trust, and wife was also not a beneficiary or a trustee and had no property interest in the trust. Vanderlugt v. Vanderlugt , 2018-NMCA-073. The district court did not err in limiting discovery into business interests. — In dissolution of marriage proceedings, where husband claimed that the district court erred in restricting husband's discovery into wife's business interests, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting discovery where all relevant financial information was already produced by wife. Vanderlugt v. Vanderlugt , 2018-NMCA-073. Expiration of statutory time. — A final decree of dissolution of marriage, which incorporates a property settlement agreement entered into by the parties, may not be modified under N.M.R. Civ.P. 60(b), NMSA 1978 (now Rule 1-060B NMRA) after the expiration of the statutory time for doing so. Wehrle v. Robison , 1979-NMSC-016, 92 N.M. 485, 590 P.2d 633. Forfeiture unenforceable. — Where a marital settlement agreement provided that the marital residence was awarded to the petitioner, that the petitioner was required to pay the mortgage on the residence, that if the respondent cured the petitioner's failure to pay the mortgage, the respondent could take title to the residence, and that the petitioner had the right to redeem the residence by paying the delinquent amounts to the respondent within thirty days; the agreement did not contain any express language regarding the method of making the redemption payment; the parties had not established a pattern for making the redemption payment; the forfeiture clause did not expressly require actual receipt of the redemption payment by the last day of the redemption period and it did not prohibit payment by mail; the petitioner mailed the redemption payment to the respondent on the last day of the redemption period; the redemption payment was delivered to the respondent after the expiration of the redemption period; the marital residence constituted the major portion of the petitioner's share of the marital assets; there was no indication that the petitioner's failure to pay the mortgage caused the respondent to suffer any prejudice to the respondent's credit; and the parties contemplated that the petitioner would move out of New Mexico after the divorce, the agreement did not contain the clear and unequivocal language required before a forfeiture will be enforced and the mailing of the redemption payment on the last day of the redemption period to the respondent constituted a timely redemption payment. Cortez v. Cortez , 2009-NMSC-008, 145 N.M. 642, 203 P.3d 857, rev'g 2007-NMCA-154, 143 N.M. 66, 172 P.3d 615. Payment by mail. — Depositing a check in the mail on the due date does not constitute payment on that date where the terms of the stipulated judgment did not authorize payment by mail and there was no course of dealing between the parties reflecting an agreement that depositing the payment in the mail constituted payment. Cortez v. Cortez , 2007-NMCA-154, 143 N.M. 66, 172 P.3d 615, cert. granted, 2007-NMCERT-011, rev'd , 2009-NMSC-008, 145 N.M. 642, 203 P.3d 857. Standard of review. — The district court's decisions in making an equitable division of community property and debts are reviewed for abuses of discretion, but the threshold question of whether a particular asset is community property is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Arnold v. Arnold , 2003-NMCA-114, 134 N.M. 381, 77 P.3d 285. Jurisdiction over community personalty located on Indian reservation. — A district court has jurisdiction to determine the disposition of community personal property located on an Indian reservation when one of the parties is an Indian, but has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court to dissolve his marriage. Lonewolf v. Lonewolf , 1982-NMSC-152, 99 N.M. 300, 657 P.2d 627, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1223, 104 S. Ct. 2672, 81 L. Ed. 2d 869 (1984). Reviewing court indulges in all inferences in favor of successful party. — In determining whether trial court's findings of fact in dispute over division of property are supported by substantial evidence, reviewing court resolves all disputed facts and indulges in all reasonable inferences in favor of the successful party and disregards inferences to the contrary. Lahr v. Lahr , 1970-NMSC-165, 82 N.M. 223, 478 P.2d 551. Court should consider tax consequences when deciding a property settlement upon dissolution of marriage. Cunningham v. Cunningham , 1981-NMSC-087, 96 N.M. 529, 632 P.2d 1167; Schueller v. Schueller , 1994-NMCA-014, 117 N.M. 197, 870 P.2d 159. It is the duty of court to divide equally property of community. Michelson v. Michelson , 1974-NMSC-022, 86 N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , 1962-NMSC-028, 70 N.M. 11, 369 P.2d 398; Ellsworth v. Ellsworth , 1981-NMSC-132, 97 N.M. 133, 637 P.2d 564. Burden to show property was separate. — The burden was on appellant to show what portion of the property before the court resulted from his separate property. Krattiger v. Krattiger , 1969-NMSC-170, 81 N.M. 59, 463 P.2d 35. Authority to apportion or set apart property. — This section does not authorize the court to apportion the community property between the spouses in its discretion, but authorized the court to set apart out of the property such portion of the property of the parties as may be required for the support, maintenance and education of the children, and to set apart such part of the husband's property as alimony as may be necessary for the support and maintenance of the wife. Beals v. Ares , 1919-NMSC-067, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780. Award of property to wife. — In a divorce action, the court has the right to award to the wife a suitable portion of the common property of the community, or the separate property of the husband. Oberg v. Oberg , 1931-NMSC-051, 35 N.M. 601, 4 P.2d 918; Hodges v. Hodges , 1916-NMSC-064, 22 N.M. 192, 159 P. 1007. Property takes status as community or separate at time and by manner of acquisition. — Property acquired in New Mexico takes its status as community or separate property at the time and by the manner of its acquisition; and if a part of the purchase money is later paid by other funds than those of the owner of the property, whether of the community or an individual spouse, the owner is indebted to the source of such funds in that amount, but such payment does not effect the title of the purchaser. Michelson v. Michelson , 1976-NMSC-026, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638. Wife's share of separate property. — The wife's rights to share in the husband's separate property invested in New Mexico, but which was accumulated from his earnings during their marriage while domiciled in a noncommunity property state, necessitates the characterization of the property as separate, to be made under the applicable laws of the noncommunity property state. Hughes v. Hughes , 1978-NMSC-002, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194. Determining interest in property. — The general conflict of laws rule by which an interest in property takes its character at the time and in the manner of its acquisition has not been superseded by the Community Property Act. Blackwell v. Lurie , 2003-NMCA-082, 134 N.M. 1, 71 P.3d 509, cert. denied, 134 N.M. 123, 73 P.3d 826. If any doubt court may hold property as community. — When entertaining an ultimate doubt as to whether property is separate or community, the trial court may resolve the doubt by holding the property to be community, if acquired after marriage and the trial court may, subject to review, set over real estate to the wife in lieu of alimony. Loveridge v. Loveridge , 1948-NMSC-044, 52 N.M. 353, 198 P.2d 444. Community property becomes separate property when divided by divorce. — When community property is divided incident to divorce, the property which previously was community estate, becomes thenceforth separate property of the respective parties. Harper v. Harper , 1950-NMSC-024, 54 N.M. 194, 217 P.2d 857. Judgment creditor may look to community property for satisfaction of judgment. — Either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community, or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined. Greathouse v. Greathouse , 1958-NMSC-032, 64 N.M. 21, 322 P.2d 1075. When creditor intervenes in divorce proceeding to assert interest in property, the court in the interest of protecting the children may not negative or disregard legal obligations, or relieve property from a valid claim presented against it. Malcolm v. Malcolm , 1965-NMSC-138, 75 N.M. 566, 408 P.2d 143. Predivorce creditor unaffected by marital settlement agreement. — While a marital settlement agreement affects the rights and liabilities of husband and wife between themselves, it has no effect upon the rights of a predivorce creditor who was not a party to the agreement; therefore, a wife who joined her husband on a share-draft account and open-end account remains obligated under the terms of those contracts. N.M. Educators Fed. Credit Union v. Woods , 1984-NMSC-101, 102 N.M. 16, 690 P.2d 1010. Apportioning assets and liabilities between parties. — In apportioning a husband and wife's assets and liabilities, the trial court must attempt to perform an allocation that is fair under all the circumstances. Fernandez v. Fernandez , 1991-NMCA-001, 111 N.M. 442, 806 P.2d 582. The court's power to apportion assets in an equitable manner should also include the ability to give effect to the parties' intentions, whether or not the parties strictly comply with the community property or debt statutes. Fernandez v. Fernandez , 1991-NMCA-001, 111 N.M. 442, 806 P.2d 582. Social Security benefits. — Social Security benefits are considered separate property and cannot be used to set off an equal distribution of community property upon divorce. English v. English , 1994-NMCA-090, 118 N.M. 170, 879 P.2d 802, cert. denied, 118 N.M. 256, 880 P.2d 867. Separate property value enhanced due to community labor. — The community is entitled to a lien against the separate property of a spouse for the enhanced value of such property attributable to community labor during marriage. Smith v. Smith , 1992-NMCA-080, 114 N.M. 276, 837 P.2d 869. Where there has been an increase during marriage in the value of a business held as the separate property of a spouse, due in part to community efforts and labor, any undercompensation of one or both spouses employed by the business is a factor which may properly be considered in determining whether a community lien should be imposed against such property; ascertaining the amount of comparable wages for the value of community labor performed on behalf of such business is an appropriate method of determining whether the value of such labor has been fairly compensated. Smith v. Smith , 1992-NMCA-080, 114 N.M. 276, 837 P.2d 869. Apportioning income between personal efforts and separate property. — In apportioning assets between a spouse's separate estate and the community, each case must be determined with reference to its surrounding facts and circumstances to determine what amount of the income is due to personal efforts of the spouses and what is attributable to the separate property employed; dependent upon the nature of the business and the risks involved, it must be reckoned what would be a fair return on the capital investment as well as determined what would be a fair allowance for the personal services rendered. Michelson v. Michelson , 1976-NMSC-026, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638. Apportionment does not require mathematical exactness but all circumstances considered. — It is impossible to lay down hard and fast guidelines in apportioning assets between the separate estate of a conjugal partner and the community; the surrounding circumstances must be carefully considered as each case will depend upon its own facts, and the ultimate answer will call into play the nicest and most profound judgment of the trial court. Mathematical exactness is not expected or required, but substantial justice can be accomplished by the exercise of reason and judgment in all such cases. Michelson v. Michelson , 1976-NMSC-026, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638. Even if the dollar amount of the property distribution is unequal, there is no requirement that each party receive exactly the same dollar value as long as the community property is equally apportioned by a method of division best suited under the circumstances. Ridgway v. Ridgway , 1980-NMSC-055, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749; Cunningham v. Cunningham , 1981-NMSC-087, 96 N.M. 529, 632 P.2d 1167. Community lien not disturbed. — Where the only separate funds of the husband used in the family home was the sum paid for the lot upon which it was constructed, and the evidence showed that the parties expended a considerable sum on the home after its completion (although whether community or separate funds were used for that purpose was unclear), that a few mortgage payments were made from community funds, that refinancing of the mortgage was accomplished by a note and mortgage signed by both the husband and wife and that the community credit was pledged thereby, and that both parties expended considerable time and effort in making improvements, and there was no attempt to trace the separate funds of the husband into the expenditures for the home after completion, the trial court's conclusion that the community had a lien of one half of the difference between the original land price and the mortgage balance attributable to community expenditures of time, effort and money (as opposed to normal appreciations) would not be disturbed. Michelson v. Michelson , 1976-NMSC-026, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638. Community does not acquire interest in corporation. — Where the husband was paid for his services to a corporation in which he owned a one-half interest which salary of course belonged to the community, and there was no proof in the record that the salary was not adequate or reasonable under the circumstances, having started at $7,500 in 1964 when he returned from college and increased to $35,000 in 1972, the trial court erred in concluding that the community had acquired an interest in the corporation. Michelson v. Michelson , 1976-NMSC-026, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638. Modification of judgment. — The only way an unmodifiable judgment of property settlement may be modified or set aside is by appeal or pursuant to a motion for relief from judgment. Russell v. Russell , 1987-NMCA-085, 106 N.M. 133, 740 P.2d 127. Wife's interest in community property not forfeited by adultery. — This section does not forfeit the wife's interest in the community property by her adultery, and her rights therein are not affected by any of her wrongs. Beals v. Ares , 1919-NMSC-067, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780. First wife estopped against claiming husband's property in second divorce. — Where San Miguel court granted divorce decree in February, 1949, retaining jurisdiction of case upon settlement of community property, and husband remarried in August, 1949, and husband and first wife entered into agreement in September, 1949, disposing of undivided interest in hotel, and second wife subsequently filed for and obtained a divorce in Bernalillo court in November, 1950; the fact that first wife's motion for a hearing in the San Miguel court for further proof concerning community property was not made until six months after the divorce decree in second court, and over two years after divorce in first court, she was estopped as against the second wife to claim the agreement was not a transmutation of community property into separate property liable for husband's independent obligations; and until the San Miguel court took some affirmative action, such as a review of the September agreement to determine the equities of the parties therein, the second court could acquire jurisdiction over the sole and separate property of the husband. Ortiz v. Gonzales , 1958-NMSC-109, 64 N.M. 445, 329 P.2d 1027. Providing for husband's share where house left to wife. — Where the net effect of leaving the home to the wife until she remarries or dies or decides to sell it is to divest the husband of his equity in the property, the trial court should order the house sold and the net proceeds distributed to the parties within a reasonable time, or make such other disposition of the home as will result in the husband receiving, within a reasonable time, his share of the value of the home. Chrane v. Chrane , 1982-NMSC-089, 98 N.M. 471, 649 P.2d 1384. Modification of original property division. — Apart from the exceptions to the general rule contained in this section and Rule 60(b), N.M.R. Civ. P., once the time has lapsed within which an appeal may be taken from a divorce decree, a court cannot change the original division of the property as an exercise of its continuing jurisdiction. Higginbotham v. Higginbotham , 1979-NMSC-003, 92 N.M. 412, 589 P.2d 196. Property division not supported where court did not pass on question of property. — In divorce proceeding where the court was neither requested nor did it pass upon any question of the property rights of the parties, neither can the action of the trial court in adjudicating the right to community property be supported as an exercise of its continuing jurisdiction under this section. Zarges v. Zarges , 1968-NMSC-151, 79 N.M. 494, 445 P.2d 97. B. VALUATION. Opinion of owner as to value. — In divorce proceedings, an owner is entitled to give opinion as to value of community property. Lahr v. Lahr , 1970-NMSC-165, 82 N.M. 223, 478 P.2d 551. Prior to enactment of rules of evidence, where spouse did not testify as to value of certain community property in divorce action, an accountant's deposition statements as to what were claimed to be the spouse's personal opinion as that value were improperly admitted, because even if those values were those of the defendant, the accountant's deposition testimony was hearsay, being the testimony of a witness as to out-of-court statements of a declarant who was not a witness as to that specific subject matter. Lahr v. Lahr , 1970-NMSC-165, 82 N.M. 223, 478 P.2d 551. Court to accept valuation of property by one spouse. — Where the only admissible evidence as to the value of certain community property was the valuation of one spouse, the trial court was required to accept this valuation in making its allocation of the community property since there was no direct evidence of spouse's lack of veracity or bad moral character, testimony contained no inherent improbabilities, nor was it surrounded by suspicious circumstances, so that legitimate inferences could be drawn therefrom to cast doubt on the accuracy of that testimony. Lahr v. Lahr , 1970-NMSC-165, 82 N.M. 223, 478 P.2d 551. Apportionment of separate property. — Apportionment is appropriate whenever community labor or community funds have enhanced the value of separate property. No one method of apportionment is favored above all others. The trial court may use whatever method will achieve substantial justice and is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Trego v. Scott , 1998-NMCA-080, 125 N.M. 323, 961 P.2d 168, cert. denied, 125 N.M. 322, 961 P.2d 167. Review of value of community property. — Where supreme court examined the record and found substantial support for the value of certain community property fixed by the court, as well as for the amount offered by the appellee, both in appellee's testimony and that of an expert appraiser who testified on her behalf, it would not disturb the court's findings. Krattiger v. Krattiger , 1969-NMSC-170, 81 N.M. 59, 463 P.2d 35. Determination of present value of profit-sharing plan as community asset. — Where evidence failed to show an ascertainable future benefit from which the trial court could make a determination of the present value of a noncontributory profit-sharing plan, the court correctly used the undiscounted current, actual value of the plan at the date of the divorce in determining its division as a community asset upon divorce. Ridgway v. Ridgway , 1980-NMSC-055, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749. Value of community interest in separate property. — A method of apportionment to give the separate property owner a fair return on the owner's investment is to determine the value of the separate property at the date of marriage, add interest that a well-secured, long-term investment would have earned to the pre-marriage value of the separate property, the resulting sum is the separate property interest, determine the fair market value of the separate property as of the date of divorce, and apportion the fair market value of the separate property as of the date of divorce by giving the separate property owner an interest equal to the separate property interest and giving the community the balance of the fair market value. Dorbin v. Dorbin , 1986-NMCA-114, 105 N.M. 263, 731 P.2d 959; Trego v. Scott , 1998-NMCA-080, 125 N.M. 323, 961 P.2d 168, cert. denied 125 N.M. 322, 961 P.2d 167. Apportionment of separate and community interests. — In the apportionment of separate and community interests in separate property that has been enhanced by community efforts, the court may consider fair market value or equity and use a rate of return on the fair market value or on the equity, in its discretion, recognizing that the two rates would be different and considering appropriate data to determine what the applicable percentage would be. Trego v. Scott , 1998-NMCA-080, 125 N.M. 323, 961 P.2d 168, cert. denied 125 N.M. 322, 961 P.2d 167. C. RETIREMENT BENEFITS. Contingent retirement benefits. — A spouse's entitlement to half of the community interest in a pension plan earned during coverture does not rest upon whether the employee's interest was vested at the time of divorce, but whether the employee's rights in the pension constitute a property interest or right obtained with community funds or labor, while rights to benefits under the retirement plan may never vest or mature due to circumstances and unforeseeable occurrences, the spouse is entitled to have the spouse's portion of the contingent interest valued and divided. Berry v. Meadows , 1986-NMCA-002, 103 N.M. 761, 713 P.2d 1017. Division of future disability benefits. — To the extent the community contributed, a husband's future federal civil service disability benefits are community property subject to division upon dissolution of a marriage. Hughes v. Hughes , 1981-NMSC-110, 96 N.M. 719, 634 P.2d 1271, superseded by statute, Koppenhaver v. Koppenhaver , 1984-NMCA-017, 101 N.M. 105, 678 P.2d 1180. Retirement benefits. — The rule for distribution of a nonemployee spouse's interest in a retirement plan, whatever the rule is, should be applied only in the absence of an agreement between the spouses on the subject. Ruggles v. Ruggles , 1993-NMSC-043, 116 N.M. 52, 860 P.2d 182. The "lump sum" method is the preferable one for satisfying the nonemployee spouse's claim to her community interest in her spouse's retirement plan, and the trial court should have discretion in implementing that method, alone or in combination with other methods, including (in an appropriate case) the "reserved jurisdiction" method, in distributing the nonemployee spouse's interest upon dissolution. Ruggles v. Ruggles , 1993-NMSC-043, 116 N.M. 52, 860 P.2d 182. Applying retirement penalties. — Absent an express agreement by the parties to the contrary, the only retirement penalties to be imposed against the nonemployee spouse's share of the pension being distributed pursuant to a "pay-as-it-comes in" method are those penalties that were actually applied to calculate the employee spouse's pension benefits, not any hypothetical penalties. Franklin v. Franklin , 1993-NMCA-077, 116 N.M. 11, 859 P.2d 479, cert. denied, 115 N.M. 795, 858 P.2d 1274. Value of fully vested pension. — When the community interest in a pension is fully vested and matured, the trial court should value the retirement benefits as a whole, including the value of the survivor's benefit provision of the retirement plan, and consider such value in apportioning each party's share of the total retirement benefits. Irwin v. Irwin , 1996-NMCA-007, 121 N.M. 266, 910 P.2d 342. Effect of timing of receipt of retirement benefits. — Where the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement which provided for the payment of a share of respondent's retirement benefits to petitioner; the marital settlement agreement was silent as to when petitioner was entitled to receive retirement benefits; respondent, who was employed by the United States Post Office, became eligible for retirement under federal retirement law in December 2005; the district court found that the parties knew and anticipated that respondent would be eligible for retirement in December 2005, that if petitioner were entitled to receive retirement benefits only when respondent actually retired, respondent would be in absolute control of when petitioner would receive petitioner's share of the retirement benefits, and that respondent failed to show that there was any discussion, negotiation, or agreement that petitioner would be paid a share of the retirement benefits only when respondent actually retired, the district court's determination that petitioner was entitled to receive a share of retirement benefits beginning in December 2005 was supported by substantial evidence. Garcia v. Garcia , 2010-NMCA-014, 147 N.M. 652, 227 P.3d 621, cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-007, 148 N.M. 610, 241 P.3d 611. Retirement benefits calculation. — Where the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement which provided for the payment of a share of respondent's retirement benefits to petitioner; the parties were divorced in 1994 and respondent became eligible for retirement in 2005; the marital settlement agreement provided for a pay-as-it-comes-in approach to distribution; the marital settlement agreement was ambiguous as to the point in time when petitioner's benefits were to be valued; the marital settlement agreement provided a formula to determine petitioner's share of the retirement benefits; the formula consisted of a fraction, the denominator of which was the total number of months of credited service at respondent's retirement, instead of the total number of months of credited service as of the date of divorce; the marital settlement agreement also provided that respondent was to receive one-half of the community interest in respondent's retirement plan through the date of August 31, 1994, and that respondent was to receive one-half of the community interest in respondent's retirement plan and all of the interest respondent accrued in the retirement plan prior to the party's marriage and subsequent to August 31, 1994, the district court did not err by determining that the benefits payable to petitioner should be calculated based on respondent's average salaries at the time of retirement eligibility, as opposed to at the time of divorce, because the formula was consistent with the time rule which is customarily applied for distribution of benefits in a manner that calls for benefits valuation at the time of retirement eligibility. Garcia v. Garcia , 2010-NMCA-014, 147 N.M. 652, 227 P.3d 621, cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-007, 148 N.M. 610, 241 P.3d 611. Present value of retirement benefits. — The value of a spouse's vested right in a defined benefit pension plan was correctly determined to be the actuarial present value of the benefit the spouse would be entitled to receive upon the plan's maturity date, taking into account monetary contributions and current pension entitlement accrued during coverture and based on the employee's current salary. Mattox v. Mattox , 1987-NMCA-021, 105 N.M. 479, 734 P.2d 259. Military retirement benefits are community property for purposes of distribution of property upon divorce. Walentowski v. Walentowski , 1983-NMSC-097, 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657. The federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, which allows each state to determine the marital property status of military retirement benefits, should be given retroactive application to the date of the decision in McCarty v. McCarty , 453 U.S. 210 (June 25, 1980). Walentowski v. Walentowski , 1983-NMSC-097, 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657. Waived military retirement pay may not be treated as property divisible upon divorce. — Federal law preempts any state from treating as "property divisible upon divorce" military retirement pay that has been waived in order to receive veteran's disability benefits. Russ v. Russ , 2021-NMSC-014, rev'g 2020-NMCA-008. New Mexico courts must apply federal law, not state law, to determine the retroactivity of a federal rule related to military retirement. — Where husband's and wife's 2006 marriage settlement agreement provided that husband had an interest in his retired military pay, which is divisible in divorce proceedings, and stipulated that wife shall receive fifty percent of husband's disposable retired pay which was earned during the term of the parties' marriage, and where eight years later, husband waived his entitlement to retired military pay in order to instead receive Combat Related Special Compensation (CRSC), a disability benefit, thereby eliminating wife's monthly percentage of husband's retirement pay, and where the New Mexico court of appeals determined that the United States supreme court's decision in Howell v. Howell, 137 S.Ct. 1400 (2017), permitted husband's unilateral election to receive CRSC in lieu of retired pay and prohibited a district court from treating as "property divisible upon divorce" military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability, but further determined that Howell announced a new rule of federal law that does not apply retroactively in New Mexico, the court of appeals erred in denying retroactive application of Howell because when a new federal rule of law is announced by the United States supreme court in a civil case, it always applies retroactively; federal law does not allow states to apply their own law to supplant a rule of federal law. Russ v. Russ , 2021-NMSC-014, rev'g 2020-NMCA-008. New principle of law related to military retirement pay not applied retroactively. — Where, upon husband and wife's divorce, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) providing wife with fifty percent of husband's disposable retirement pay which was earned during the term of their marriage, and where, eight years after the divorce, husband waived his retirement pay in order to receive disability-based combat related special compensation, thereby eliminating wife's monthly percentage of husband's retirement pay, the district court's order requiring husband to pay wife what they agreed to in the MSA was inconsistent with the United States supreme court's recent decision in Howell v. Howell , 137 S.Ct. 1400 (2017), which held that a state court's capacity to order reimbursement or indemnification of post-divorce waived retirement pay in an effort to restore past marital settlement agreements or its own past order dividing marital assets is expressly preempted, and therefore, impermissible in New Mexico. Howell , however, establishes a new principle of law by abrogating established New Mexico precedent that protects a wife's interest, awarded by decree, in her husband's military retirement benefits, and retroactive application of Howell would unjustly and inequitably undo significant provisions of marital settlement agreements that were based on New Mexico precedent. Russ v. Russ , 2020-NMCA-008, cert. granted. Indemnity provision. — Federal law does not prohibit state courts from enforcing indemnity provisions which ensure the payment of a minimum sum to a non-military spouse as the spouse's share of a community pension, provided that veteran's disability benefits are not specified as the source of such payments. Scheidel v. Scheidel , 2000-NMCA-059, 129 N.M. 223, 4 P.3d 670. Nondisability military retirement pay is separate property of the spouse who is entitled to receive it, and it is not subject to division upon dissolution of marriage. Espinda v. Espinda , 1981-NMSC-098, 96 N.M. 712, 634 P.2d 1264, superseded by statute, Ruggles v. Ruggles , 1993-NMSC-043, 116 N.M. 52, 860 P.2d 182. Nondisability military retirement pay. — That part of Espinda v. Espinda , 1981-NMSC-098, 96 N.M. 712, 634 P.2d 1264, holding that the character of nondisability military retirement benefits is separate property is superseded to the extent authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 1408. Walentowski v. Walentowski , 1983-NMSC-097, 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657. Disposition of retirement or pension benefits. — To dispose of retirement or pension benefits in a divorce proceeding, the trial court should make a determination of the present value of the unmatured pension benefits with a division of assets which includes this amount, or divide the pension on a "pay as it comes in" system. This way, if the community has sufficient assets to cover the value of the pension, an immediate division would make a final disposition; but if the pension is the only valuable asset of the community and the employee spouse could not afford to deliver either goods or property worth the other spouse's interest, then the trial court may award the nonemployee spouse his/her portion as the benefits are paid. Copeland v. Copeland , 1978-NMSC-011, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99. III. RESTRAINING PROPERTY USE. Restraining order application confers jurisdiction over property. — Application for a restraining order to prevent husband or wife from disposing of community property effectively confers jurisdiction over the property on the court, while mere institution of divorce proceedings will not. Lohbeck v. Lohbeck , 1963-NMSC-071, 72 N.M. 78, 380 P.2d 825. Order restraining disposition of stock conferred jurisdiction. — Where divorced wife made motion in one division of district court to vacate divorce decree because husband had failed to disclose corporate stock, issuance of order restraining disposition of such stock conferred jurisdiction of the res on the divorce court and subjected stock to the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the marital status of the parties even though the court did not take actual possession of the res, although execution had issued from another division of district court to be levied on stock to satisfy a judgment against husband. Greathouse v. Greathouse , 1958-NMSC-032, 64 N.M. 21, 322 P.2d 1075. Transferring community property during pendency of divorce. — Action by husband of transferring certain community property of which he was principal stockholder, during pendency of a divorce action, does not constitute actionable contempt. Lohbeck v. Lohbeck , 1963-NMSC-071, 72 N.M. 78, 380 P.2d 825. IV. ALLOWING AND MODIFYING ALIMONY. A. IN GENERAL. Purpose of alimony. — Alimony is not intended to constitute a penalty imposed upon a husband, but that it is a personal right intended for the purpose of one spouse supporting the other after losing sustenance and the support of coverture, although alimony is not to be condoned when it amounts to one spouse abdicating that spouse's responsibility to support and maintain themselves. Lovato v. Lovato , 1982-NMSC-052, 98 N.M. 11, 644 P.2d 525. Subsection F of this section is construed to mean what it says. — In cases in which the marriage lasted twenty or more years, the court must retain jurisdiction to consider spousal support when the final decree was silent as to such support. Rhoades v. Rhoades , 2004-NMCA-020, 135 N.M. 122, 85 P.3d 246. Subsection F provides express authority for a district court to award spousal support. Rhoades v. Rhoades , 2004-NMCA-020, 135 N.M. 122, 85 P.3d 246. Reduction in spouse's share of military retirement benefits. — Subsection F of this section is read to permit the award of spousal support where the cause for the award develops from financial inequity resulting from a reduction in a spouse's share of military retirement benefits due to an increase in disability benefits. Rhoades v. Rhoades , 2004-NMCA-020, 135 N.M. 122, 85 P.3d 246. Effect of bankruptcy court's action. — Where the district court had independent statutory authority on which to award spousal support, a bankruptcy court's factual findings, legal conclusions, and judgment had no preclusive effect. Rhoades v. Rhoades , 2004-NMCA-020, 135 N.M. 122, 85 P.3d 2
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